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By Tsuneo Akaha (USA)
Introduction
The landscape of international relations in Northeast Asia is changing,
and migration and other types of human flows within and between the countries
of the region are becoming an important part. The state-centric approach to and
view of international relations that prevailed in this part of the world during the
Cold War can no longer describe or explain the logic and shape of emerging
realities.  The “Cold War,” as the ideological order of the state-centric world,
has become a thing of the past, although its remnants can still be seen on the
divided Korean peninsula.  Old and new manifestations of nationalism are
interacting with expressions of nascent regionalism.1 Non-state actors that have
transformed global politics have become important agents of change in this
region as well. They are giving rise to new issues, new perspectives, and new
identities among the peoples of Northeast Asia, although resistance to the
forces of change is also visible. Such topics as human security, labor migration,
human trafficking, and refugees are emerging as a focus of political debate and
policy discussion in the region.
In order to examine the changing population trends and migration patterns
in Northeast Asia and their implications for international relations in the region,
the Monterey Institute of International Studies’ Center for East Asian Studies
organized in 2002 a multi-year research project drawing on the expertise of
researchers from the region as well as from the United States and the United
Kingdom.2 The findings and conclusions from this project were published in
the book Crossing National Borders: Human Migration Issues in Northeast
Asia from the United Nations University, Tokyo.3 The book illuminates the
cases of Chinese migrants in the Russian Far East; Russians, Chinese, and
1 Tsuneo Akaha, ed., Politics and Economics in Northeast Asia: Nationalism and Re-
gionalism in Contention, New York: St. Martin’s, 1999.
2 The project was jointly sponsored by the Center for East Asian Studies, Monterey
Institute of International Studies and the Peace and Governance Programme, United Na-
tions University (UNU), and supported by grants from UNU, the Freeman Foundation, and
the US Institute of Peace.
 3 Tsuneo Akaha and Anna Vassilieva, eds., Crossing National Borders: Human Migra-
tion Issues in Northeast Asia, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005.
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Koreans in rural Japan; North Koreans in China; and migration issues in South
Korea and Mongolia.
This brief analysis draws on the findings from the above research project
and additional considerations regarding human trafficking and human rights
issues pertaining to international migrants and then discusses the implications
for Mongolia. More specifically, the study will address the following questions:
What are the current patterns of cross-border migration in Northeast Asia and
what problems is international migration presenting? What opportunities and
challenges does international migration represent for Mongolia? Finally, what
specific steps should Mongolia take to gain benefits from international migration
and limit the negative consequences thereof?
Cross-border Migration in Northeast Asia
At the end of the 20th century, there were an estimated 175 million
international migrants, nearly 3 percent of the world’s people and twice the
number in 1975. Some 60 percent of the international migrants – about 104
million – were in developed countries and the remaining 71 million in developing
countries.4 In 2000, 1,627 million—about 28 percent of the world’s population—
were living in the Northeast Asian countries of China, Japan, North and South
Korea, Mongolia, and Russia. The population of migrants living in these
countries numbered 19,029,000, which represented only 11.7 percent of the
global migrant stock.5 The relatively small size of the migrant population in the
region reflects the tight control the Northeast Asian governments have
traditionally maintained over the movement of people across their national
borders and points to the prospect for substantial future growth in cross-
border migration in the region. Indeed Northeast Asia has lagged behind other
regions of the world in the voluntary movement of individual citizens across
state borders. However, there are signs throughout the region that a major
change is afoot. Increasing numbers of ordinary citizens in all Northeast Asian
countries are finding it necessary, desirable, and indeed possible to travel to
neighbouring countries, some of them deciding to settle permanently in the
host society, others finding temporary employment as migrant workers, and
still others simply as tourists.
4 Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now, New York: Commission on
Human Security, 2003, p. 41, http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/ (Accessed 12
August 2004).
5 Maurice D. Van Arsdol, Jr. et al., “Population Trends and Migration Patterns in
Northeast Asia,” in Akaha and Vassilieva, p. 21.
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In Northeast Asia’s modern history, the interests of central governments
long dictated international relations.6 As the most powerful political institutions
in the nation-states in the region, the central governments controlled political
relations, commercial ties, and human contacts across national boundaries. In
the post-Cold War period, however, voluntary movement of individual citizens
across national borders has become a visible aspect of the region’s international
relations and it is growing. This development is challenging the national
authorities’ power to control their frontier areas, exposing their inability to limit
the impact of migrant communities within their societies, and even threatening
the host societies’ ethnic and national identities.
The growing cross-border human flows in Northeast Asia have far-
reaching implications at various levels. First, they have the potential to change
the nature of international relations in the region. On the one hand, the cross-
border movements of people may promote the development of a regional identity
among the countries’ leaders by creating opportunities for international
cooperation to address migration-related challenges, such as migrant labor,
transnational human resources development, human rights violations against
migrants, infrastructure development for international education and tourism,
international crime, trafficking in humans, drugs, and weapons, and the spread
of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases. On the other hand, inability to
forge effective international cooperation in addressing these problems may
highlight disagreements, contradictions, and conflicts between the perspectives
and interests of the governments of the region. Moreover, the movement of
people across national borders has the potential to exacerbate the enmity and
suspicion that have long characterized state-to-state relations in this region.7
The absence of a multilateral global framework for the management of
movements of people across national borders is well recognized.8
Second, cross-border human flows in Northeast Asia present both
opportunities and challenges to individual citizens, be they border-crossing
6 See Tsuneo Akaha, ed., Politics and Economics in Northeast Asia; and Samuel Kim, ed.,
The International Relations of Northeast Asia, Oxford, UK: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004.
7 For a comprehensive examination of factors stunting the development of regional
cooperation, see Gilbert Rozman, Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust
in the Shadow of Globalization, Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2004.
8 World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, A Fair Globalilzation:
Creating Opportunities for All, Geneva: World Commission on the Social Dimension of
Globalization, 2004, p. 95.
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persons or members of the host communities. As the final report of the Human
Security Commission states, “For many people...migration is vital to protect
and attain human security, although their human security may also be at risk
while they are migrating.”9 Migrants and other border-crossing people are known
to expand opportunities for economic exchange between businesses and
individuals, enlarge social networks between different nationalities, and promote
the development of transnational communities made up of people of the same
ethnic, cultural heritage living in separate countries. The cross-border movement
of people may also contribute to the development of transnational identities
that are based not on nationality or ethnicity but on shared professional interests
and practices.10 On the other hand, international human flows can also threaten
the material wellbeing of host community members by, for example, stressing
their natural and social environment or displacing local workers. The welfare of
migrants and other border-crossing individuals may also be endangered by
outright violation of their human rights or more subtle forms of discrimination
and injustice. Moreover, the influx of foreigners can also elevate social tension
at the community level by threatening or being perceived as threatening the
communal identity and social order of the host society, and emigration also
reduces the pool of human resources and disrupts social networks in the sending
communities.11
The gravity of problems and concerns regarding migration issues varies
from case to case. National security concerns are the most pronounced in the
case of Chinese migration to the Russian Far East, although the analyses our
colleagues in the joint project expose some of the exaggerated fears in the
Russian Far East about the consequences of the influx of Chinese migrants into
this economically fragile region. In contrast, the case of Russians in Japan, the
situation of Koreans in Japan, and the circumstances of Chinese in Japan present
not security concerns but cultural and social issues regarding integration, ethnic
stereotypes, and discrimination against foreign residents in the provincial areas
9 Commission on Human Security, p. 41, http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/
(Accessed 12 August  2004).
10 Peggy Levitt, “Transnational Migrants: When ‘Home” Means More Than One Coun-
try,” Migration Information Source, Washington, D.C., 1 October 2004,http://
www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=261 (Accessed  20 January 2005)
11 The World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization cautions that the
promotion of international labor migration should be tempered by the recognition of the
costs associated with it, for both sending and receiving countries. World Commission on the
Social Dimension of Globalization, p. 97.
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of Japan. The same can be said about the ill treatment of foreign migrants in
South Korea and Mongolian women who are vulnerable to human trafficking.
The most serious human security concerns are found in the case of North
Koreans in China.
In the concluding chapter of the book Crossing National Borders, my co-
author and I offer the following general observations:
First, although border crossing by ordinary citizens in Northeast Asia is
mostly motivated by economic reasons and clearly has economic impacts on
both the countries of origin and destination, it has political, social, cultural, and
security implications as well. The influx of Chinese traders and migrant workers
into the Russian Far East, for example, is an important and necessary stimulant
for the region’s economy, but it also is a source of irritation for local population
whose sense of vulnerability has been aroused by the economic stagnation
and depopulation they have been experiencing in recent years. In Japan and
South Korea, abuses of visa overstayers and illegal foreign workers by shrewd
employers are a growing concern to immigration and law enforcement authorities
in the host countries. Also of concern are the deceptive practices of some labor
export and import agents, as well as human trafficking organized by criminal
groups, who exploit the vulnerable status of border-crossing persons, in China,
Russia, Mongolia, Korea, and Japan.12
Second, crimes committed by foreigners are attracting the growing
attention of the public and law enforcement agencies in all Northeast Asian
countries. Criminal acts by foreigners, often in partnership with local organized
crime, are testing the tolerance of impacted communities toward foreigners
whom they often cast in negative stereotypes.
Third, lack of mutual understanding between foreign residents/visitors
and local population often results from language and cultural barriers as well as
from perceived disparities in the distribution of benefits from their interaction.
Discrimination against and loss of ethnic identity among younger generations
of Korean residents in Japan and elsewhere concern older members of the
Korean communities in Japan those South Koreans who desire solidarity with
Korean communities overseas.
Fourth, “brain drain” is an issue of growing concern to Mongolia as some
of the most skilled and best educated citizens leave the country in search of
12 Widespread labor recruitment malpractices, fraud, and abuses in many Asian countries
are noted in International Labor Office, Summary of Conclusions, Report of the Regional
Tripartite Meeting on Challenges to Labor Migration Policy and Management in Asia, 30
June-2 July 2003, Bangkok; cited in ibid., p. 44.
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opportunities abroad, although their remittances represent an important benefit
for Mongolia’s economy.
Fifth, the migration issue that is potentially the most troubling in political
and security terms relates to the status of North Koreans who have left their
country and are living in China, Mongolia, South Korea, and elsewhere.
Unfortunately, we do not know what impact if any the highly publicized
“defection” of North Korean citizens to other countries is having on the regime
in Pyongyang. What we do know is that their presence in the foreign destination
or transit countries has often been a subject of diplomatic tension.
Sixth, currently, there is no institutional framework for multilateral
coordination of policies to address these issues in Northeast Asia. As Scalapino
pointed out in “Preface”, the need for multilateral cooperation is evident. How
likely is it that the Northeast Asian countries will move beyond the current
unilateral (internal) responses and bilateral adjustments and engage in serious
multilateral cooperation? So far, we have seen no summitry among the national
leaders of the region dealing with international migration issues. Nor is there
any serious effort to establish institutional mechanisms for multilateral
coordination. Virtually all policy changes in the migration sector have been
through domestic (i.e., unilateral) or bilateral processes.
Seventh, cross-border migration has the potential to contribute to the
development of a regional identity among the peoples of Northeast Asia through
the sharing of cultural values and development of a sense of a common future
across national boundaries. So far, however, ethnic, cultural, and national
identities are still very powerful forces in Northeast Asia and the influx of
foreign migrants and visitors into local communities is reinforcing those
identities.
Eighth, what is the impact of international migration on the security
concerns of the governments and peoples of Northeast Asia? The UN
Commission on Human Security states, “Massive population movements affect
the security of receiving states, often compelling them to close their borders
and forcibly prevent people from reaching safety and protection. Armed elements
among civilian refugee populations may spread conflict into neighbouring
countries.”13 Northeast Asian countries have yet to face such a dire situation.
However, the countries in this region face some difficult issues of national and
human security related to cross-border human flows. The instability on the
13 Ibid., p. 42.
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Korean Peninsula and possible North Korean refugee flows of massive
proportions have the potential to disrupt the peace and stability there.
Ninth, human security concerns in Northeast Asia include the plight of
North Koreans in China and elsewhere in the region, countless cases of
discrimination, exploitation, human rights abuses against migrant workers and
other border-crossing persons, and the illegal status of growing numbers of
migrant laborers. There is also evidence that some migrants in vulnerable legal
positions and without basic social support resort to crime. Criminal elements in
both sending and receiving countries also present serious challenges to the
law enforcement authorities in the region. Also, trafficking in person has also
grown in Northeast Asia, and women and children are particularly vulnerable.
We would be remiss if we did not mention the growing phenomenon of
human trafficking in Northeast Asia, although this was not explicitly a part of
our international collaborative project.
All Northeast Asian nations are in some way involved in the process of
the illegal transport of humans across national borders for commercial sexual
exploitation and forced labor. There are no reliable data on trafficking in the
Northeast Asian region, which is to be expected for an illegal activity that is
often associated with organized crime networks. Some estimates put the global
flow of trafficked persons at nearly one million individuals. If all of Asia accounts
for about one-third of this number, then Northeast Asia’s share of human
trafficking flows is naturally less than 300,000.14
Table 1: Human Trafficking Linkages in Northeast Asia
14 Ibid. p. 112.
NEA Country Sending to: Receiving from: Transit Point 
China Japan, ROK, Russia, 
Singapore, Sri Lanka, 
Taiwan, Rest of World 
DPRK Yes 
DPRK China, Russia -- -- 




Mongolia China, ROK -- -- 





Russia China, Japan, Mongolia, 
ROK, Gulf States, Macao, 
Sri Lanka 
China, DPRK Yes 
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Sources: Piyasiri Wickramasekera, Asian Labour Migration: Issues and Challenges
in an Era of Globalization, International Migration Programme, International Labour
Office No. 57, Geneva: International Labour Office, 2002; Demetrious Papademetriou
and Sarah Margon, “International Migration Trends and Patterns in Asian and Oceania,”
in Irena Omelaniuk, ed., World Migration 2005: Costs and Benefits of International
Migration, Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2005; U.S. Department
of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, Office of the Under Secretary for Global
Affairs No. 11252, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, June 2005.
The primary characteristics of human trafficking are similar across the
region. The quest for economic opportunity is one factor. Many victims of
trafficking are deceived by traffickers, who lure the former with promises of
legitimate employment in foreign countries. In many cases, victims have even
paid large sums of money to their exploiters as a service fee.15 The combination
of restrictive migration policies and legal loopholes also facilitates the spread
of trafficking. For example, Japan’s “entertainer” visa system was long used for
bringing in woman for commercial sexual exploitation, although recent regulatory
changes may improve the situation.16 Another characteristic is the increasing
feminization of international migration in Asia.17 Many of these women are
legitimate economic migrants working as domestic help or healthcare providers.18
Others are women deceived by devious criminal schemes. Women migrants
tend to be more vulnerable to trafficking, especially women in marginalized
positions (divorced, widowed, etc.).19 It should be remembered, however, that
trafficking victims are not exclusively women, nor are they used exclusively for
sexual exploitation. Men, women and children throughout Asia are trafficked
for exploitative labor, too, often bordering on involuntary servitude.20
15 Piyasiri Wickramasekera, Asian Labour Migration: Issues and Challenges in an Era
of Globalization, International Migration Programme, International Labour Office No. 57,
Geneva: International Labour Office, 2002, pp. 19-20.
16 Demetrious Papademetriou and Sarah Margon, “International Migration Trends and
Patterns in Asian and Oceania,” in Irena Omelaniuk, ed., World Migration 2005: Costs and
Benefits of International Migration, Geneva: International Organization for Migration,
2005, p. 113.
17 “World Migration 2005,” in Irena Omelaniuk, ed., World Migration 2005: Costs and
Benefits of International Migration, IOM World Migration Report Series, Vol. 3, Geneva:
International Organization for Migration, 2005, p. 390.
18 Wickramasekera, pp. 13-14.
19 Papademetriou and Margon, p. 113.
20 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, Office of the Under Secretary
for Global Affairs No. 11252, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, June 2005.
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An important measure of a state’s commitment to the protection of human
rights of migrants is whether it is a party to the core international human rights
conventions and international treaties pertaining to migration. Table 2 lists
such treaties and indicates the ratification status of the Northeast Asian states.
Most states in the region are parties to the core international human rights
treaties. The notable exceptions are China, which has not joined the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights, and North Korea, which is not a party
to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination or the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Russia has ratified the Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children. Japan and South Korea have signed but not yet ratified the protocol.
However, Japan revised its penal code and immigration law in June 2005 to
criminalize human trafficking.21 China, North Korea, and Mongolia have not
signed the protocol.
Table 2: International Human Rights Treaties and States Parties in
Northeast Asia (As of June 3, 2005)
Ratification (r); accession (a); succession (s)
21 “Panel OKs Bills to Aid Victims of Trafficking,” Japan Times, 15 June  2005, http://
www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/makeprfy.p15?nn20050615a5.htm> (accessed 15 June 2005).
 ICERD ICCPR ICE SCR 
CED 
AW CAT CRC 
Trafficking 
Protocol 
China a  r r r r  
Japan a r r r a r  
ROK a a a r a r  
DPRK  a a a  a  
Mongolia r r r r a r  
Russia a r r r a r r 













China a a a    
Japan r a a    
ROK r a a    
DPRK a      
Mongolia a      
Russia r a a   
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Notes:
ICERD: UN International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (adopted in 1965; entered into force in 1969; ratified by 170 as of
March 1, 2005)
ICCPR: UN International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (adopted in 1966;
entered into force in 1976; ratified by 154 states as of March 1, 2005)
ICESCR: UN International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (adopted
in 1966; entered into force in 1976; ratified by 151 states as of March 1, 2005)
CEDAW: UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (adopted in 1981; not yet in force; ratified by 179 states as of March 1,
2005)
CAT: UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment (adopted in 1987; not yet in force; ratified by 139 states as of
March 1, 2005)
CRC: UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted in 1989; went into force in
1990; ratified by 192 states as of March 1, 2005)
Trafficking Protocol: Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime (adopted in 2000; entered into force in
2003; ratified by 87 states as of September 4,2005)
Vienna Convention: Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (adopted in 1963; entered
into force in 1967; ratified by 166 states as of March 1, 2005)
Refugee Convention: UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (applied to
refugee situations before 1951; adopted in 1950; entered into force in 1954;
ratified by 142 states as of March 1, 2005)
Refugee Protocol: UN Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (applied to refugee
situations after 1951; adopted in 1967; entered into force in 1967; ratified by 142
states as of March 1, 2005)
ILO C97: ILO Convention concerning Migration for Employment (Convention No. 97;
adopted in 1949; entered into force in 1952; ratified by 42 states)
ILO C143: ILO Convention concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the
Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers
(Convention No. 143; adopted in 1975; entered into force in 1978; ratified by 18
states as of March 1, 2005)
ICMW: UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families (adopted in 1990; entered into force in
2003; ratified by 27 states as of March 1, 2005)
Sources:
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Status of
Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties.” <http://
www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/docs/RatificationStatus.pdf> (accessed August 31, 2005);
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United Nations, “United Nations Treaty Collection,” <http://untreaty.un.org/
sample/EnglishInternetBible/bible.asp> (accessed August 31, 2005);
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/
crime_cicp_signatures_trafficking.html> (accessed September 3, 2005);
International Labor Organization, “Database on International Labor Standards,”
<http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/newratframeE.htm> (accessed August 31, 2005);
Stefanie Grant, “Migrants’ Human Rights: From the Margins to the Mainstream,”
Migration Policy Institute, Washington, D.C., March 21, 2005, <http://
www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/print.cfm?ID=291> (accessed August 6, 2005).
All Northeast Asian countries need to cooperate with the other countries
of Northeast Asia in strengthening and harmonizing human rights laws and
practices in the region. As in the case of European integration, where the
European Council and the European Convention for Human Rights play a central
role, so in Northeast Asia regional cooperation is necessary for the advancement
and harmonization of human rights related policies and practices as part of
regional integration efforts. As the movement of people across national borders
increases, new institutions should be established and agreements concluded
to protect the human rights of migrant and minority populations. More liberal
migration policies and enhanced protection of human rights will help to reduce
crime, alienation, and other social risks involving migrants and minorities.
Migration in Mongolia
The number of foreign visitors to Mongolia has increased dramatically
since 1990, most of them short-term visitors or tourists in the summer. A large
part of the foreign presence in the country is contract workers—mostly from
China—employed by foreign-invested companies. There are also a considerable
number of missionaries, especially from Korea, who are trying to establish
Christian churches and are actively recruiting young believers.
The number of foreigners arriving in and departing from Mongolia has
grown steadily and reached its peak in 2002 (Table 3), and declined in 2003
because of the SARS concern.
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Table 3: Number of Arrivals and Departures by Country
Source: Mongolian Statistical Yearbook 2002, Ulaanbaatar: National Statistical
Office of Mongolia, 2003, pp. 225.
The statistics above show that the majority of foreign visitors come from
the two neighbouring countries, China and Russia. Overstaying of a visa is a
common problem among foreigners in Mongolia. If a foreigner stays longer
than 30 days, he/she must register with the Immigration Service or its offices in
the provinces. In 2003 alone, 1,732 foreign citizens from 52 countries were fined
for illegal visa extension or for violation of the registration policy. By far the
largest segment of the foreigners who received fines for violating the registration
requirement were Chinese citizens (1,224 persons or 70.6% of the total), followed
by 132 Russians (7.6%).22
As of August 31, 2003, there were 8,090 foreign contract workers from 72
countries registered with the Ministry of Social Welfare and Labor. Among
them, Chinese workers numbered 2,890 (or 35.7%), Russians 1,744 (21.6%), and




2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002 
USA 6,451 6,653 6,860 6,511 7,122 7,058 
Australia 1,008 1,262 1,761 1,134 1,278 1,752 
UK 2,800 3,122 3,537 3,032 3,021 3,306 
South Korea 8,039 10,098 14,536 8,239 10,214 14,392 
Germany 4,206 5,388 6,856 4,068 5,869 6,395 
Denmark 602 617 863 639 627 721 
Italy 743 961 987 801 914 958 
Kazakhstan 1,677 1,569 1,976 1,510 1,536 1,740 
Canada 611 825 1,062 663 782 1,058 
Netherlands 1,391 1,352 1,739 1,302 1,595 1,665 
Russian 
Fed. 
49,456 66,415 71,368 48,712 62,037 66,985 
Sweden 904 1,331 1,388 729 1,167 1,411 
China 57,546 67,360 92,657 48,024 62,960 90,771 
France 1,841 2,764 2,891 1,918 2,732 3,378 
Switzerland 637 666 875 326 869 1,502 
Japan 11,392 11,565 13,708 13,987 17,576 13,527 
Other 8,901 10,109 12,201 8,168 9,826 13,727 
TOTAL 158,205 192,057 235,165 149,763 190,125 230,346 
 
22 Tsedendamba Batbayar, “Foreign Migration Issues in Mongolia,” in Akaha and Vassilieva,
p. 222.
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Ukrainians 1,741 (21.5%). The foreign contract workers were working mostly in
the construction sector (2,257 or 27.9%), mining (2,673 or 33.0%), and wholesale
and retail trade (1,433 or 17.7%).23
Mongolia’s proximity to China makes it very attractive to Chinese citizens
as a transit point to more advanced countries, but this has created some problems.
In May 2001, for example, a Chinese citizen was arrested at Buyant-Ukhaa
airport for attempting to bring 104 Chinese passports into Mongolia illegally.24
In other cases, Chinese citizens have illegally bought forged Mongolian
passports and subsequently used them in attempts to enter a third country.
Mongolia has also attracted criminal schemes for human trafficking. For example,
in January 2004, Korean national Pak Song-ki was deported from Mongolia for
trying to sell over 400 Mongolian girls to Japan and Korea. An investigation
revealed that the South Korean demanded $300 from each woman who responded
to fall advertisements for jobs overseas. It was confirmed that 50 of the women
had gone to Japan.25
Human trafficking has become a serious issue in Mongolia, as elsewhere
in Northeast Asia and the rest of the world. Batbayar cites a study conducted
by Center for Human Rights Development (CHRD), a Mongolian NGO. The
report states that the trafficking network is well established in Mongolia and
native residents have become more and more involved in private trafficking
schemes.26 The Human Rights Commission in Mongolia estimated that by the
end of 2002 over 200 women had been trafficked.27 Only in sensational cases
(the first prosecution for human trafficking was in 2001, against Japanese
businesses), such as when the victim returns to Mongolia, is the issue recorded.
In 2003, there were fourteen prosecutions of human traffickers in Mongolian
courts, and two persons were denied entry into the country on suspicion of
being involved in trafficking activities. The generally held consensus is that
South Koreans generally take girls via air, whereas Chinese traffickers generally
focus on road and rail networks to move their victims out of the country. One of
23 Reference material, Department of Employment, Ministry of Social Welfare and
Labor, 8September 2003; cited in Batbayar, p. 223.
24  Zuunii Medee, 25 May 2001; cited in Batbayar, p. 223.
25 UB Post, (Mongolia’s English weekly newspaper), 30 January 2004; cited in Batbayar,
pp. 224.
26 UB Post, 19 February 2004; cited in Batbayar, p. 224-225.
27 “Mongolia”, Stop the Traffic 2 Conference, Melbourne: Asia Pacific Forum of National
Human Rights Institutions, 2003,  http://www.asiapacificforum.net/advisory/trafficking/
news.htm (accessed 28 January 2006.
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the two denied entry to Mongolia in 2003 was a British citizen. A worrying trend
in human trafficking from Mongolia is the use of former victims as traffickers.
Mongolian women who have worked for a time in China, Macau, and Hong
Kong are sent back to Mongolia to recruit new women. Although Mongolia
has passed laws to prohibit such recruiting, the problem of human trafficking
will continue so long as Mongolia remains one of the least developed countries
in the region.28
Other types of criminal activity, including narcotics trafficking, are also a
growing concern to Mongolian law enforcement agencies. In 2000, for example,
Mongolian police detained about 50 foreign citizens, including 23 Chinese and
21 Russians.
The U.S. State Department reports that Mongolia is not a party to the
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or the 1967 Protocol. The
Mongolian government has not established laws or rules for granting refugee
status. Nevertheless, Mongolia did adhere to some bare minimum practices
with regards to refugees, including non-refoulement. Asylum requests were
rarely granted. The Mongolia Government has embarked upon minimal
cooperation with UNHCR. No data are available on the refugee population of
Mongolia, although there are reports of small numbers of North Koreans residing
in Mongolia. Like China, the Mongolian government seems to prefer classifying
these individuals as “economic migrants.”29
The presence of North Koreans in Mongolia has attracted international
media attention. The New York Times reported, for example, “Bolstered by
President Bush’s re-election and a new American law that calls for spending
$20 million a year to help North Korea’s refugees, refugee advocates would like
to see Mongolia, sandwiched between Russia and China, play roughly the
same role as Portugal’s during World War II; a neutral state where refugees
could be processed for settlement in other countries, preferably by the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.”30
The number of Mongolian citizens traveling abroad has increased
dramatically since 1990. The democratic reform in the country has resulted in
28 “Mongolia”,  Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2004 , Washington, D.C.:
State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2005,  http://
www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41652.htm  (accessed January 29, 2006).
29 “Mongolia,” in U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State Country Report
on Human Rights Practices 2004, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 28 February 2005.
30 New York Times, November 21, 2004; cited in Batbayar, p. 225-226.
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the institution of the right to travel abroad. Passports have been liberally issued
to all Mongolian citizens 18 years of age and older. Accordingly to Batbayar,
30,000 Mongolian citizens traveled abroad in 1990 and by 1999 that number had
increased 30 times. Russia and China are the closest and most popular
destinations for Mongolian travelers abroad. Table 3 shows the number of
Mongolian citizens who traveled for various purposes through the various
ports of entry to Russia and China in 2002.
Table 4: Outbound Mongolian Passengers by Port and Purpose, 2002
Source: Mongolian Statistical Yearbook 2002, Ulaanbaatar: National Statistical








45,217 8,118 25,323 1898 480 9,398 
Sukhbaatar 
(to Russia) 
22,067 360 19,847 240 278 1,342 
Altanbulag 50,676 923 48,854 144 474 281 
Tsagaan Nuur 13,286 1,615 11,671 - - - 
Ulgii 432 5 359 28 - 40 
Khankh 3,568 10 3,558 - - - 
Arts suuri 6,420 73 6,331 1 1 16 
Ulikhan 2,210 241 1,959 - 4 6 
Ereentsav 1,945 130 1,810 - - 5 
Borshoo 12,714 241 12,433 5 13 49 
Zamiin Uud 
(to China) 
296,140 10,199 275,311 5,324 89 5,217 
Gashuun-
Sukhait 
22,025 - 22,025 - - - 
Bichigt 3,451 77 3,374 - - - 
Bulgan 20,819 75 20,744 - - - 
Dayan 794 4 790 - - - 
Baitag 6,045 15 6,030 - - - 
Burgastai 1,025 - 1,025 - - - 
Shivee-
Khuren 
12,101 - 12,101 - - - 
Khavirga 14,051 8 14,043 - - - 
TOTAL 536,306 22,156 488,819 7,693 1,338 16,354 
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In 2003, an estimated 100,000 Mongolians were living and working in
foreign countries. Over 17,000 were estimated to be in South Korea.31 Most
Mongolians in South Korea are engaged in low-wage factory labor. One problem
has been the overstaying of 30-day tourist visas on which most Mongolians
enter South Korea. Many of them are illegally employed and face exploitation
for cheap labor and lack of medical care and insurance protection. As the number
of Mongolians deported from South Korea has increased, the Mongolian
government has asked the Korean government to protect their interests. At the
end of 2001, there were 976 Mongolians in the Czech Republic with valid work
visas, and thousands more were estimated to be otherwise living and working
there. It is interesting to note that 69% of the Mongolians legally working in the
Czech Republic were women.32
These types of problems are not unique to Mongolian migrants overseas.
In fact, they are quite common in Northeast Asia and elsewhere around the
world.
Conclusion: Implications for Mongolia
Some administrative reforms are necessary to improve inter-agency
coordination on immigration policy in all Northeast Asian countries. Effective
management of migration, exploitation of the benefits migration brings to both
the sending and destination countries, and control of the harmful consequences
of migration require timely coordination of policies that are normally developed
and implemented by separate government agencies. For example, population
policy, economic development policy, foreign policy, national security policy,
public welfare policy, education policy, and labor policy all have direct and
indirect effects on in-migration and out-migration. Yet, there is not one country
in Northeast Asia where there is a focal point of policy coordination at the high
echelons of government.
Against the background of globalization, cross-border human flows
cannot but grow in the future in this and other parts of the world. In Northeast
31 “Human Rights and Freedoms in Mongolia,” Status Report, Ulaan Baatar: National
Human Rights Commission of Mongolia, 2003, http://www.nhrc-mn.org/docs/
Annual%202003%20Status%20Report.pdf. (accessed January 30, 2006).
32 “The Times They Are A-Changing,” Sharing Experience: Migration Trends in Se-
lected Applicant Countries and Lessons Learned from the ‘New Countries of Immigration’ in
the EU and Austria, Vienna: International Organization for Migration, 2004, <http://
www.iom.int/DOCUMENTS/PUBLICATION/EN/ION_II_CZ.pdf > (accessed January 31,
2006).
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Asia, economic interdependence is gradually deepening through market forces,
particularly among Japan, China, and South Korea. As market economies
continue to grow in Russia and Mongolia, so will the complementary linkages
between these economies with the other economies of the region. Social
integration proceeds through networks of individuals, enterprises, and other
groups and organizations whose activities transcend national borders. Cultural
integration can also deepen through exchanges between individual citizens,
business organizations, and civil society groups. This region also needs
integration through cooperation in non-traditional security fields, such as
environmental protection, resource management, control of illegal trafficking in
drugs, weapons, and humans, containment of the HIV/AIDS and SARS epidemic,
counter-terror measures, and management of cross-border human flows.
What are the specific steps Mongolia should take?33
First, there is a need to improve the overall legal framework to address
new immigration issues and concerns more effectively. Questions are being
raised both inside and outside of Mongolia about the desirability and
practicability of the numerical limit on the number of foreign immigrants —that
the number should not exceed one percent of Mongolian population at any
given time—and the ban on dual citizenship. Mongolia’s emphasis on regional
integration in Northeast Asia shows how necessary it is to balance sovereignty
with mechanisms allowing transnational movements of goods, people, and
services or through special economic zones. Labor import from such countries
as China, Belarus, and Ukraine is likely to increase. Exceedingly low wages and
incomes in Mongolia compared to developed countries are a major cause of
“brain drain.”
Second, the government must put more efforts and resources into
educating the public to change their attitudes towards foreigners. Overemphasis
on the protection of ethnic identity, way of life, culture, and language leaves
the public ignorant about the country’s need to engage the international
community for its own interests. Unwelcoming treatment of foreign residents
or visitors in Mongolia will hurt this need. More Mongolian citizens are
supplementing their income with the help of foreigners. They obtain contracts
with foreign companies or agencies, rent apartments to foreigners, and rely on
foreign capital in establishing small businesses.
33 This section draws heavily from Batbayar, pp. 233-234.
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Third, increased exposure of Mongolia and its citizens to globalization
forces has brought new problems, such as human trafficking, illegal migration,
and transnational crimes. Mongolia should join the related UN conventions
and strengthen its coordination with regional and foreign organizations dealing
with these problems. Low income, high unemployment, and the desire to earn
hard currency are the main incentives for many Mongolians to go abroad.
While expatriate Mongolians may send family remittances from abroad, the
exodus of potential workers can weaken the nation’s human resources.
Fourth, since the late 1990s hundreds of North Koreans have come to
Mongolia, obviously for reasons of personal safety. Most of the North Korean
“defectors” who have entered Mongolia have found safe passage to South
Korea, their destination of choice. Although Mongolia has dropped its earlier
policy of moving North Koreans to China, partly because of pressure from
international human rights groups, Mongolia has yet to join the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees. It is urgent for Mongolia to join the
convention and actively participate in the promotion of the human rights of
international refugees.
Mongolia is now an open, democratic society and needs to be fully
engaged in international affairs, including open flows of goods and services,
information and technology, as well as people. The Mongolian government
must embrace the international conventions and treaties defining and protecting
the rights of migrations and others – both Mongolian citizens and others – who
cross national borders to advance their well-being. Finally, the Mongolian people
must find a balance between their need to maintain their national identity based
on their history and culture and their growing need to work with people of other
nationalities and citizenships, both inside Mongolia and outside.
